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ABSTRACT
Steganalysis of Video Sequences Using Collusion Sensitivity. (May 2005)
Udit Budhia, B.E. , Birla Institute of Technology, India
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Deepa Kundur
In this thesis we present an effective steganalysis technique for digital video sequences
based on the collusion attack. Steganalysis is the process of detecting with a high proba-
bility the presence of covert data in multimedia. Existing algorithms for steganalysis target
detecting covert information in still images. When applied directly to video sequences
these approaches are suboptimal. In this thesis we present methods that overcome this
limitation by using redundant information present in the temporal domain to detect covert
messages in the form of Gaussian watermarks. In particular we target the spread spectrum
steganography method because of its widespread use. Our gains are achieved by exploiting
the collusion attack that has recently been studied in the field of digital video watermarking
and more sophisticated pattern recognition tools. Through analysis and simulations we,
evaluate the effectiveness of the video steganalysis method based on averaging based col-
lusion scheme. Other forms of collusion attack in the form of weighted linear collusion and
block-based collusion schemes have been proposed to improve the detection performance.
The proposed steganalsyis methods were successful in detecting hidden watermarks
bearing low SNR with high accuracy. The simulation results also show the improved per-
formance of the proposed temporal based methods over the spatial methods. We conclude
that the essence of future video steganalysis techniques lies in the exploitation of the tem-
poral redundancy.
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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION ∗
A. Steganography
Steganography is the art of hiding messages in innocuous looking mediums such as text
files, audio files, images, video sequences etc. It is different from cryptography where the
goal is to convert the message into a form that is not easily comprehensible or deciphered.
The main aim of steganography is to hide the very presence of the message by embedding
it into a host carrier known as the cover object such that it is not detected. The sender
embeds a secret message ’m’ into the cover–object ’c’ to obtain a stego-object ’s’ using an
embedding scheme and a secret key ’K’ [1]. A common element shared by steganography
and cryptography is that, the security of the underlying methods lie in the secrecy of the
embedding and the cryptographic keys, respectively. In other words, the attacker should
not be able to detect the presence of the message in the former or be able to decipher
the message in the latter without having access to the secret key. As in cryptography, we
assume that the details of the embedding algorithm are known to the attacker. (Kerckhoff’s
Principle [2]).
The existence of steganography has been recorded even in the ancient times where
hidden messages were tattooed on the shaven heads of messengers. The messengers were
sent across borders once their hair grew and were later shaved again to deliver the message.
Much known form of steganography, like sending hidden messages using invisible ink on
∗Reprinted from pages 210–214, with permission from“Video steganalysis using col-
lusion sensitvity” by U. Budhia and D. Kundur, Proceedings of SPIE: Sensors, Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence(C3I) Technologies for Homeland Security and
Homeland Defense, April 2004, vol. 5403.
The journal model is IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control.
2blank papers or written letters, was used by Great Britain [3]. As we can see, steganog-
raphy is not restricted to mediums such as text, images, audio, video etc. A form of text
steganography used by German spies in World War II taken from [3] is shown below. The
following message was sent:
“Apparently neutral’s protest is thoroughly discounted and protested. Isman hard
hit. Blockade issue affects pretext for embargo on byproducts, ejecting suets and vegetable
oils”. Taking the second letter from each word the sentence reads,“Pershing sails from NY
June 1”.
The modern form of steganography is represented in terms of the Prisoner’s Prob-
lem [4], in which A and B are two inmates, confined to separate cells in a prison and are
hatching an escape plan. All communication between them goes through a warden W. In
order to exchange messages without arousing any suspicion in the minds of W, they need
to pass the information secretly inside a medium that does not draw any attention. The
warden may be passive where she just tries to determine whether there is something hidden
in the cover object. In this case, the overall goal of steganography is to hide the message in
such a way that it is difficult for the third party to distinguish between a cover-object and a
stego-object while ensuring accurate covert communication. On the other hand the warden
may be active and alter the stego-objects before passing it to B. The following World War
II historical example elucidates the actions of an active warden [5]. A telegram originally
sent as “Father is dead” was changed to “Father is deceased”. This prompted a reply,
“Father dead or deceased?” Thus we can see that apart from sending the message in a
way that it does not produce any detectable artifact it should be hidden in a robust manner
to survive all perturbations along the path.
3B. Steganalysis
The process of detecting the presence of covert communication through innocuous looking
multimedia distribution, with high probability is called steganalysis. It is a way of dis-
tinguishing between a stego-object and a cover-object. A steganalyst may be passive or
active [6]. A steganalyst is said to be passive if his only goal is to detect the presence of
a message. He/she may try to identify the embedding method used to hide the messages
in the cover medium. However an active steganalyst tries to estimate the hidden message
itself. Since finding the true message may be impossible due to secure encryption schemes
available in the market, he/she may try to figure out the location or the length of the hidden
message or estimate the parameters used in the embedding process (e.g. the strength of the
watermark or hidden message in case of spread spectrum steganography [7, 8]).
In this thesis we propose a method to detect the presence of steganographic messages
in video data and do not consider estimation of the message. We design a steganalysis
method that detects the presence of hidden messages in raw video sequences by taking ad-
vantage of the inherent temporal redundancy present in a video sequence. We study the
advantages and disadvantages over the current steganalysis methods that can be incorpo-
rated for video.
In order to design a passive steganalysis system, one should look for the statistical
changes brought about in the cover medium due to embedding. The changes can be quan-
tified and compared to a threshold or to a known database to arrive at a decision. A typical
steganalysis system is shown in Figure 1. The attacker or the steganalyst obtains a copy of
the host signal from the communication channel. After processing it, he/she measures the
statistical change in the host signal due to embedding. The quantified change t is compared
against a threshold thresh to arrive at a decision of whether there is something hidden or
not.
4Fig. 1. Steganalysis system.
C. Motivation and Applications
The recent attacks on information systems, cyber-security and cyber-forensics have become
a primary concern for both governments and commercial industries. Attackers of informa-
tion systems can potentially use sophisticated means to hide messages in multimedia for
covert communications. Identifying such communications must be automated in order to
be able to effectively and practically monitor such behavior [9]. The presence of a temporal
domain increases the volume of covert data that can be embedded into a video sequence.
Thus from an embedder’s point of view, using video sequences as cover-objects is the best
choice since the capacity or the amount of covert data that can be carried is very high when
compared to other mediums such as text and digital audio.
A number of efficient and reliable techniques have been proposed for still images that
can be applied to raw video sequences, but to the best of our knowledge, there have been no
steganalysis techniques proposed targeting the characteristics of digital video. This moti-
vates us to develop a video steganalysis scheme that can be used to detect hidden messages.
5The video steganalysis is a fundamental problem that has implications for watermark at-
tacks too. The results can be used to design better steganalysis and watermarking methods.
Steganalysis finds its use in a broad area of applications ranging from computer secu-
rity, cyber-security, cyber-forensics, homeland security, field of watermarking etc. Auto-
mated steganalysis techniques can be used to monitor the astronomical amount of Internet
data to detect the presence of cover communication. One of the ways to use the Internet to
pass covert data apart from using digital media as carrier is through the time stamps of the
Internet packets. Steganalysis can be used to stop terrorists from using steganography as
a means of covert communication. According to unnamed law officials terrorist organiza-
tions are hiding maps and photographs of potential targets, instructions for other terrorists
on chat rooms and pornographic sites [10, 11].
Some parties use these sophisticated data hiding methods to pass Trojan content for
malicious purposes or to get some information from the receiver without its knowledge.
One such instance can be stated from the era of cold war between USA and Russia. The
United States security agencies loaded Trojan content in a Control’s software built for a
gas-pipeline in Russia in 1982. The Trojan ran a test on the pipeline and doubled the
pressure causing an explosion equivalent to a nuclear weapon [9, 12]. Detecting Trojan
content is yet another application where steganalysis finds its use.
Steganalysis can be used in the field of digital forensics by examiners who look for
hidden data or trace of hidden data in digital media [13]. A possible scenario is the distribu-
tion of child pornography using digital media as a cover object [14]. Steganalysis softwares
will be useful in detecting the presence of such content and can act as a proof in the court
of law. It can be used to differentiate between a natural image and digitally made images
using graphics application softwares [15]. This finds its use in court cases where the origin
of the image (natural, digitally made) is in question. Forensic experts are also hired by
6companies to detect steganographic programs on the server that may be constantly sending
sensitive information from the company databases.
Steganalysis may help in the design of computer security programs like anti-virus pro-
grams. Recently viruses were attached in JPEG images to take advantage of a security flaw
in Microsoft’s image viewer programs [16]. Steganalysis may be used to detect viruses,
spywares, adwares and other malicious programs that may be hidden in digital media and
may affect a computer.
Steganalysis and watermarking have a lot of commonality between them. Collusion
schemes proposed in this thesis can be used to get an estimate of a watermark in a video
sequence. This can be used to authenticate or detect the presence of a watermark in the
sequence. Thus we see that steganalysis also finds its use in the field of watermarking.
D. Objectives
The objectives of this thesis are:
1. To propose efficient steganalysis techniques for video sequences that take advantage
of the temporal redundancy present in it. We develop a composite method that can
be used to detect messages hidden using a variety of embedding schemes that work
in the spatial as well as the frequency domain. Most of the current methods assume
the knowledge of the embedding scheme and thus are able to achieve higher detec-
tion accuracy. However there is a trade off between the detection accuracy and the
applicabality of steganalysis to a broad class of embedding algorithms. The inspira-
tion is drawn from a number of currently available steganalysis techniques aimed at
detecting hidden messages from a variety of embedding schemes [17, 18, 19, 20].
2. To highlight the limitations of data hiding in video. In this thesis we assert that
the chances of detection of hidden messages greatly improve due to the presence of
7temporal redundancy in a video sequence. This limits the capacity of the payload
that can be successfully embedded in a video sequence without producing statistical
artifacts. We show by theoretical arguments and simulations that it is infeasible to
hide data in those parts of video that are non-moving or have translational motion. A
successful steganalysis algorithm is recognized by its ability to restrict the capacity
of hidden messages in the cover medium.
3. To study the relationship between the fields of steganography and watermarking.
There are many tools borrowed from watermarking that are used in steganography
and vice versa. Through this thesis we want to support the fact that watermarking
and steganography complement each other. We use collusion attack–a well studied
area in the field of watermarking for our proposed steganalysis method. On the other
hand, steganalysis can be used to detect the presence of a watermark.
4. To study the tradeoff between statistical invisibility and robust embedding of hidden
messages in a video sequence. Through analysis and simulations we show the lower
bounds on the embedding strengths of the hidden message that leads to the failure of
the proposed steganalysis method.
5. To design a steganalysis method that can be applied for real-time applications. Most
researchers assume the availability of infinite processing power for steganalysis.
However this assumption poses serious challenges for real-time applications if the
method has a large time complexity. In order to monitor the presence of a stegano-
graphic data in a broadcast video scenario a steganalysis method with low time
complexity is needed. We propose a method that has a very low memory and process-
ing power requirement and hence can be use for real-time video monitoring.
8E. Nomenclature
A steganographic system involves two parties: the sender who embeds the secret message
in the cover object and the receiver who extracts it. Security comes in part from the pres-
ence of a secret key K in the system that details how the secret message is embedded and
extracted. We assume that K is securely exchanged between the sender and receiver prior
to covert communication; this key is specific to the steganography algorithm and can con-
tain information such as how strongly and where in the cover-object the secret information
is embedded, and seed information for pseudo-random number generation.
Communication
ChannelEmbedding Algorithm
Steganographic Steganographic
Extraction Algorithm
Steganography
Secret Message
Binary
(e.g. Digital Image)
Cover Object
Message
Decoded
Steganalysis
Active/Passive
Secret Key Secret Key
Covert Data???
Eavesdropper/Monitoring Point
SENDER RECEIVER
Fig. 2. Steganography and steganalysis. Steganography consists of the process of embed-
ding (by a sender) and extracting (by a receiver) covert information from innocuous
messages. Steganalysis is the process of determining from a given message whether
or not covert data has been embedded [21].
A typical steganographic system scenario is summarized in Figure 2. The sender takes
the “host” video sequence, which represents the cover-video, and embeds a secret binary
message vector using K to produce a stego-video sequence that is perceptually identical
to the cover-video. The stego-video is then communicated along a public channel to the
9receiver. At the receiver the stego-object and secret key K are used to extract the secret
binary message. The public channel may be monitored by an active or a passive steganalyst
whose goal is to detect the presence of any covert communication taking place.
The original host video sequence or the cover-object is denoted by Uk(m,n) where
1 ≤ k ≤ N is the frame number and m,n are the row and column indices of the pixels,
respectively. The binary secret message is embedded into the host by modulating it into a
signal known as the watermark [7] denoted by Wk(m,n). Since the influence of the secret
message is carried on to the watermark, we will use the terms hidden message and wa-
termark interchangeably throughout this thesis. Detection of the watermark will imply the
presence of hidden information in the medium. For compatibility, the watermark Wk(m,n)
is defined over the same domain as the host Uk(m,n). Later on we will ease on this con-
straint and will look at watermarks embedded in the Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT)
domain. The stego-video signal is represented by the commonly used equation [22]:
Xk(m,n) = Uk(m,n) + αk(m,n) ·Wk(m,n) k = 1, 2, 3 . . . N , (1.1)
where αk(m,n) is a scaling factor used to manipulate the strength of the hidden message to
trade-off between perceptibility and robustness. In practice, for simplicity α is considered
to be constant over all the pixels and frames. So the equation becomes:
Xk(m,n) = Uk(m,n) + α ·Wk(m,n) k = 1, 2, 3 . . . N . (1.2)
The scaled watermark α · Wk(m,n), in practice, is a function of the binary secret
message, secret key K and the host Uk(m,n). The relation between these parameters is
decided by the embedding algorithm. In general, every steganographic algorithm can be
represented by Equation 1.2, where we first set a value for α 6= 0, and let Wk(m,n) =
Xk(m,n)−Uk(m,n)
α
. In order to have a proper reference for effective steganalysis, we must
make some assumptions about the embedding method as discussed in the next section.
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F. Problem Formulation
The overall goal of this thesis is to design a steganalysis method for digital video sequences
that is more optimum than frame by frame application of previously proposed image meth-
ods that do not taken into account the temporal redundancy that can be exploited for higher
accuracy detection. We consider this problem by first restricting our video processing to
the temporal domain; image methods that work in the orthogonal spatial domain can then
be easily incorporated to enhance performance over previously proposed techniques. We
focus on steganalysis of spread spectrum-based steganographic methods [7, 8] due to its
popularity and influence in the research literature.
In essence, our problem is to develop a decision box that takes a stream of digital
video as input and concludes whether or not hidden information is present by using partial
information about the embedding algorithm and a model of temporal redundancy in digital
video frames; no knowledge of the secret key K, if any is used, is available. In particular,
we assume the spread spectrum-based embedding method works by inserting Gaussian
watermarks in the spatial or frequency domain of each frame [7, 8]. We therefore make
the following necessary assumptions. First, we postulate that the watermarks embedded
in each frame Wk(m,n) are independent, have zero mean, and are Gaussian. Second, the
sender embeds a watermark into every pixel of each frame of the video sequence; this
assumption is valid because to maximize the steganographic capacity, a sender will make
use of as much of the host signal as possible for information embedding. There is, however,
a trade-off between steganographic security and transmission capacity as we later discuss.
Figure 3 displays the steganographic results for a single image frame to elucidate the
concept. Figure 3(a) is the host frame also known as cover-object or cover-video frame,
and Figure 3(b) is the stego-object or stego-video frame containing the Gaussian watermark
(amplified for visual perceptibility) shown in Figure 3(c) with α = 5.
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Cover Image Stego Image Gaussian Watermark
Fig. 3. Example of steganography in a single image frame. (a) the host or cover-image
frame, (b) the watermarked or stego-image frame, (c) the watermark containing the
binary secret message.
The figures of merit used to assess success of the algorithm are the probability of false
positive detection and the probability of false negative detection defined as follows. The
probability of false positive detection is the likelihood of detecting that hidden information
is present in a given video sequence when nothing has been embedded (i.e., α = 0); that
is, a given video signal is declared a stego-video when it is not. The probability of false
negative detection is the likelihood of detecting that hidden information is not present when
in fact it has been embedded (i.e., α 6= 0); that is, a given video signal is declared a
cover-video when it is not. A good steganalysis technique should strive to minimize both
error probabilities. However, for cyber-security or computer forensic applications, it is
imperative that the false negative detection rate be lower. Thus, sacrificing false positive
detection for false negative detection may be necessary through the selection of appropriate
algorithmic thresholds. Further processing on a video signal flagged by our technique may
be optionally conducted for more accurate results. Figure 4 summarizes the basic video
steganalysis problem for spread spectrum embedding.
12
     Decision Box
Video Steganalysis
about the embedding algorithm
input output
present or absent
Covert Data
Additional information and assumptions 
Video Sequence under Test
Fig. 4. Video steganalysis problem. The objective is to design an decision box that takes
a given video sequence and makes use of partial information about the potential
embedding algorithm to decide whether or not hidden information is present in the
given media [21].
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
A. Past Work
Much of the research work in the field of steganalysis has been carried out on images. In
raw format, video sequences can be considered as a series of still images and the steganaly-
sis methods designed to work for still images can be applied to video sequences. So in this
section we look at all the significant steganalysis methods specifically built for still images.
1. Passive Steganalysis
Most of the steganalysis methods developed over time were designed to be passive i.e. the
goal was just to detect the presence of hidden messages. Jessica Fridrich, a pioneering
researcher developed efficient algorithms to foil steganography schemes based on Least
Significant Bit (LSB) embedding. In [23] Fridrich et al. propose a method to detect LSB
embedding in 24 bit color images by exploiting the fact that the number of unique colored
pairs decreases after embedding. The method works reasonably well but has certain con-
straints since the success of the method is based on the number of unique colored pairs.
The authors have pointed out the infeasibility of embedding messages in digital images
stored in JPEG format in [24]. The JPEG quantization matrix leaves unique fingerprints in
the image. Any deviation from these characteristics signifies the presence of covert data.
Other methods such as performing first order statistical analysis in the form of Chi-Square
test on Pair of Values has been proposed by Westfield and Pfitzman in [25]. However this
strategy fails if the LSB embedding is done at random locations based on some seed. In
[26] the authors have shown how first order statistics can be defeated by making sure that
the statistics derived from Pair of Values remains same before and after embedding.
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The failure of first order statistical techniques led to the development of methods [17,
18, 15, 27] that uses higher order statistics. In this work, Farid and his colleagues designed
a blind detection scheme that uses higher order statistics such as mean, variance, skew
and kurtosis to measure the disruption of statistical regularity in the wavelet coefficients
due to embedding. He uses linear and non-linear classification methods such as Fischer
Linear Discrimination Analysis [17] and Support Vector Machine [18] to solve the two
class classification problem. The statistics are believed to be rich enough to detect messages
using different schemes. In [27] the authors have extended their method to color images
and have shown how a reduction from a two class classification problem to a single class
can significantly improve the detection capability. This method has better generalization
properties and helps in foiling a variety of the embedding schemes.
In [1, 19] the author uses image quality metrics and multivariate regression analysis
to detect the presence of covert data in an image. It has been proposed that the distance
between a watermarked image and its filtered version is greater than a non-watermarked
image and its filtered version. The image quality metrics most sensitive to embedding
schemes [28] are chosen to measure the change in distance. The weighted sum of the dis-
tance measured from these metrics is calculated and compared to a threshold to detect the
hidden messages. In a similar implementation in [19], Avcibas et al. use binary similarity
measures to calculate disruption of the correlation between the 7th and the 8th bit plane
due to LSB embedding. We adopt a similar strategy as proposed in [1] by using temporal
filters to get the best estimate of the watermark in each frame and use characteristics of the
watermark to detect it.
In [20] Harmsen and Pearlman propose a steganalysis method for all those embed-
ding schemes where the watermark or hidden message can be modeled as an independent
additive noise. Their detection scheme exploits the first order statistics of the Histogram
Characteristic Function (HCF). They hypothesize that embedding lowers the center of mass
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of the HCF due to filtering action of noise added in the form of hidden message. A Bayesian
Classifier is used to differentiate between a cover and a stego-image by measuring the Cen-
ter of Mass and comparing it to a threshold. It is not an efficient scheme since counter
measures to compensate for changes in the first order statistics have been proposed. The
authors have also proposed a generalized detection scheme where the training is done based
on a single class and Mahalanobis distance is used for detection.
The methods proposed for steganalysis in [29, 30] targets wavelet based embedding
techniques. This is of particular significance since the current image compression algo-
rithm JPEG2000 is based on wavelets. In [30] the parameters for a Generalized Gaussian
Distribution to model the sub-band coefficients in a 3 level wavelet decomposition of an
image are calculated. The parameters from the high frequency horizontal, vertical and diag-
onal regions are fed to a neural network. The neural network is trained using a database of
watermarked and non-watermarked images for which the GGD parameters are calculated.
The neural-network captures the non-linearity in the decision making process.
Another method that uses wavelet analysis to detect hidden messages in wavelet do-
main is proposed in [29]. In the proposed method the energy of the wavelet coefficients
is calculated by taking the Discrete Fourier Transform of it. The strength of the spikes
in the energy curve are measured and compared to a threshold to detect presence of hid-
den data. Both the methods seem to work reasonably well in the wavelet domain but lack
generalization.
2. Active Steganalysis
The aim of active steganalysis techniques is to estimate the hidden message or to find
information pertaining to the embedding scheme. (message length, embedding strength
etc.)
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In [6] Chandramouli suggests a method to estimate the hidden message embedded us-
ing spread spectrum principles in two highly correlated stego images. Strong assumptions
about two stego images having the same secret message and embedding key are used in the
steganalysis method. He shows that the common notion of spread spectrum steganogra-
phy being robust and secure is wrong. In this thesis we try and break the spread spectrum
steganography and support the conception that it is not a good method for steganography.
In [31] Trivedi et al. propose a method to find the secret key in those digital images which
use sequential embedding strategy. The paper focuses on spread spectrum steganography
and demonstrates that it leaves a sufficient statistical mark to facilitate active steganalysis.
Fridrich et al. have proposed different methods to estimate the length of the messages
in digital images for different steganographic algorithms in [32]. It can accurately mea-
sure the length of the message in JPEG images using the F5 and the Outguess, in palette
based images using EZstego, in raw formats using the LSB embedding schemes. The gain
achieved in detecting low capacity payload with high accuracy is at the expense of the loss
in generalization capability.
3. Collusion Research
In [22] Su et al. have presented a mathematical framework for linear collusion in video
sequences and have presented the notion of statistical invisibility. A theoretical proof has
been provided to justify that all watermarks embedded in the video sequences can be suc-
cessfully removed if they are embedded independent of each other or have small correlation
with the host sequences. The conditions in which the linear collusion scheme would fail
to remove the watermark have been provided. We were inspired by this work since most
of the embedding schemes fail to meet these conditions and hence linear collusion scheme
could be used to detect the presence of a hidden watermark in video sequences. In [33]
Kilian et al. have calculated the minimum number of colluders needed to have a successful
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collusion scheme for images. Insight into the number of frames needed to collude in a
video sequence can be drawn from the authors’ findings.
In [34, 35] the authors have used non-linear collusion attack to remove the Gaussian
fingerprints embedded in still images. Performance evaluation for various non-linear at-
tacks has been done. The idea is to replace blocks in an image with similar looking blocks
from other images thus changing the embedded watermark in the original image. However
a non-linear attack will fail to obtain a mark free copy from the watermarked sequence
which is needed in our strategy.
Temporal filtering and other intra-frame collusion schemes were implemented in [36]
to remove watermarks from video sequence. A new technique for watermark removal using
mosaicing was proposed. This is a potential method that could be used for steganalysis to
detect the presence of a hidden data. But there are potential limitations to this method since
it works well only for panoramic videos.
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CHAPTER III
PROPOSED SOLUTION, ANALYSIS AND JUSTIFICATION ∗
The essence of a steganalysis technique is to quantify the statistical change brought in the
cover medium due to embedding. In order to detect the change, a steganalyst may look
for the deviation in the characteristics of the cover or probe into the features of the hidden
message itself. The pros and cons of each method are discussed below.
Modeling the cover medium limits the steganalysis attack to a narrow class of cover
objects that have characteristics of the natural medium. For example in [15] Farid et al. ex-
tract the characteristics of natural images using wavelet coefficients. The assumption is that
any deviation from these characteristics signifies the presence of covert data in an image.
There are limitations to this method because images such as medical images, satellite im-
ages and digital images (constructed artificially from graphics application softwares) which
do not belong to the subset of natural images will always be classified as stego-images.
In order to overcome the above constraint a steganalyst may target the characteristics
of the embedded message or changes brought about in the cover due to a particular kind
of embedding strategy. This however leads to the loss of generality and the ability of a
steganalysis method to detect messages embedded using different steganographic methods.
Due to diversity in the time varying nature of video sequences, we assert that it is
impossible to find a well-defined set of features that can differentiate between natural video
and stego-video. This leads us to focus on methods that target the characteristics of the
hidden message. For spread spectrum steganography, this is specifically in the form of
Gaussian watermarks. The detection capability of our proposed steganalysis technique
∗Reprinted from pages 214–218, with permission from“Video steganalysis using col-
lusion sensitvity” by U. Budhia and D. Kundur, Proceedings of SPIE: Sensors, Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence(C3I) Technologies for Homeland Security and
Homeland Defense, April 2004, vol. 5403.
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is theoretically limited to spread spectrum steganography but is applicable to embedding
either in the spatial or in the frequency domain.
A. Basic Architecture
As discussed above, the spirit of most steganalysis methods is to devise a function that dif-
ferentiates between the general characteristics of a signal with and without embedding [21].
This function is normally compared implicitly or explicitly to a threshold in order to decide
whether or not a given signal Yk contains hidden information1. Much research on image
steganalysis has focused on identifying image features that change when steganography
algorithms are applied. Researchers have traditionally employed image processing and sta-
tistical tool-sets that in some form attempt to estimate a potential “host” Uˆk = H[Yk] signal
from Yk. This “host” estimate Uˆk is then compared in some way to Yk in order to detect if
something is hidden. The basic hypothesis is that the deviation of specific characteristics
of Yk and Uˆk will differ if something is embedded in Yk (i.e., Yk = Xk = Uk + α ·Wk)
in comparison to when nothing is embedded in Yk (i.e., Yk = Uk). Pattern classification is
often employed to characterize this deviation effectively.
In this thesis, we formulate a novel framework for this problem that employs previous
research on digital watermarking attacks. The advantage is that instead of searching li-
braries of image processing and statistical functions in order to identify potential candidates
for steganalysis, we borrow on venerable research in the related field of digital watermark-
ing. Furthermore, our approach is general and can be targeted to identify specific types of
steganography by replacing our general blocks with appropriate algorithms.
1Please note that we have removed the subscripts m,n from our notations for clarity.
For the rest of this thesis we will assume that all operations are done on the entire frame
unless stated otherwise.
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Figure 5 presents our framework. The video sequence under consideration Yk is passed
through a digital watermarking attack block that attempts to estimate the host signal to
produce Uˆk. This block may assume knowledge of the embedding algorithm (if any is
used) to be effective. The estimate of the watermark Wˆk, calculated by taking the difference
between Yk and Uˆk, is passed through an appropriate pattern classifier. If Yk is a stego-video
then the input to the pattern classifier is a Gaussian watermark signal corrupted by some
noise due to filtering(watermarking attack). On the contrary, if Yk is a video signal without
any watermark the estimate Wˆk would simply consist of the noise due to filtering. In an
ideal case, if the filter is able to perfectly re-construct the host, the estimate Wˆk will consist
of the original Gaussian watermark embedded in case of a watermarked video and will
be zero for a non-watermarked video. By employing some a priori information about the
embedding algorithm, the distinction between these two cases can be made to detect the
presence of covert communication.
Fig. 5. Proposed framework for steganalysis [21].
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Since our goal is, in part, to develop a tool to enhance existing image steganalysis
methods, we focus on algorithms for Figure 5 that account for temporal changes in a signal
due to embedding. Together, with image steganalysis methods that incorporate spatial in-
formation through the use of (weighted) mean and Wiener filters, an improved solution may
be produced. We conjecture that the linear collusion attack, used to remove the presence
of independent digital watermarks in a sequence of images or video frames is ideal for our
problem. First, the attack focuses on temporal correlations between video frames to esti-
mate a “host” video sequence that can be easily incorporated into our framework. Second,
much analytic and simulation-based work focuses on this area providing a strong foun-
dation upon which to build a steganalysis method. Finally, the attack is computationally
simple making our steganalysis approach practically feasible for real-time applications.
An effective pattern classifier is also developed by incorporating knowledge that the
watermark, if any present, is zero mean and Gaussian. The design of the pattern classifier
is discussed in the future sections. In the next subsections we dicuss the linear collusion
scheme which is used to estimate the host sequence Uk from the received signal Yk. In
particular we discuss the various schemes that can constitute the “attack” block in Figure 5.
B. Collusion Attack
Collusion for digital watermarking and steganography refers to the use of multiple image
frames (that may or may not form a video sequence) in order to remove the presence of
a watermark in one or more of the image frames. In general, the collusion attack may be
linear or nonlinear exploiting the differences and similarities between frames to judiciously
reduce the energy of the watermark in comparison to that of the host information. We
represent collusion of a sequence of video frames, which produces a resulting frame that
has lower watermark content as follows:
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Xˆk = C[X1, X2, . . . , XN ] (3.1)
where Xˆk is called the colluded result and in this thesis represents the estimate of the kth
host frame Uk. C is the collusion operator that exploits the similarities and differences
amongst all or a select subset of watermarked image frames X1, X2, . . . , XN to produce
Xˆk. As we discuss, the colluded result Xˆk in general contains significantly less contribution
from Wk as compared to Xk. Common forms of the collusion operator C include taking the
pixel-by-pixel maximum, minimum, mean or median over a range of image frames.
Linear collusion is a special case in which C represents a weighted average operation
of select video frames. Intuitively, linear collusion on a sequence of video frames amplifies
parts of the frames that are similar and attenuates components that are different. In the next
subsection we concentrate on a subset of linear collusion attack where the weights applied
to each frame in the collusion attack are equal. This leads to a simple collusion scheme
where we take an average over a range of video frames. For the rest of this thesis we
refer to the averaging based collusion method as the simple linear collusion scheme. The
linear collusion method where the weights are different will be referred to as the weighted
collusion scheme.
1. Simple Linear Collusion Scheme
Linear collusion has recently received much attention in the digital video watermarking
community [22, 33]. It has been shown analytically that if the linear correlation amongst
host video frames Ui for some i differs from that of the watermark frames Wi over the same
range of i then the linear collusion scheme based on averaging will be successful in either
attenuating or amplifying the presence of the watermark in the resultant frame Xˆk [22].
23
In this thesis, we focus on the application of spread spectrum steganography on video
sequences that in most applications requiring high covert data capacity implies that Wi is
independent for each frame. We assume that the motion in the video sequence is “slow”
which implies that adjacent video frames are similar. Because of this visual correlation, it
is expected that over a neighborhood of i centered at k, the watermarked video frames can
be averaged in order to attenuate the presence of the watermark in the kth frame.
Let us assume that we use a sliding window to denote the temporal neighborhood used
for frame averaging; this window is assumed to contain visually similar frames. Specifi-
cally, we take a window size of 2L + 1 frames centered at frame k (except toward the
beginning and end of the sequence since the window goes outside the range of i) to average
the video sequence. Let us formally define the collusion operator CL for the simple linear
collusion scheme as:
CL = 1
2L+ 1
k+L∑
i=k−L
(3.2)
The operator represents an averaging over a window of 2L+1 frames centered over a frame
having index k.
The estimate of the kth host frame is given by:
Xˆk = CL(Xk) (3.3)
Xˆk =
1
2L+ 1
k+L∑
i=k−L
Xi (3.4)
Equation 3.4 is modified for frames that lie in the beginning and in the end of a video
sequence.
Xˆk =

1
2L+1
∑2L+1
i=1 Xi 1 ≤ k ≤ L
1
2L+1
∑k+L
i=k−LXi L < k < N − L
1
2L+1
∑N
i=N−2LXi N − L ≤ k ≤ N
(3.5)
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where k is the frame under consideration to produce Xˆk, an estimate of Uk. We next show
why we assert that Xˆk ≈ Uk.
Substituting Xi = Ui + α.Wi for all i from Equation 1.2 into Equation 3.5 we obtain:
Xˆk =
1
2L+ 1
∑
i
Ui +
α
2L+ 1
∑
i
Wi (3.6)
where the summations are over the appropriate domains for the various ranges of k shown
in Equation 3.5. Since the watermarks Wi are independent and zero mean, the second term
of the left hand side of Equation 3.6 approaches zero as L increases. Furthermore, because
we assume Ui ≈ Uk for all i in the neighborhood of the sliding window centered at k, the
first term will dominate resulting in the following approximation:
Xˆk ≈ 1
2L+ 1
∑
i
Ui (3.7)
≈ 1
2L+ 1
∑
i
Uk (3.8)
≈ Uk (3.9)
The effectiveness of Xˆk as an approximation of Uk depends on the value of L in
relation to the rate of motion in the video sequence. Through extensive analysis we show
that an optimum value of L will lead to the cancelation of the Gaussian watermarks and
ensure the assumption that Ui ≈ Uk for all i holds true.
If collusion is applied to a given video sequence Yk that may or may not contain
a watermark, we believe that in both cases for slowly varying video and an appropriately
selected value of L, the result will be an effective approximation of Uk. Thus if a watermark
is embedded in the video, subtracting Xˆk from Yk gives Yk − Xˆk ≈ Yk − Uk = αWk, an
estimate of the scaled zero mean Gaussian watermark. If no watermark is present in Yk then
the result will be independent of any characteristics such as Gaussianity that we assume for
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the watermark. This difference is used by a pattern classifier discussed in the future sections
for steganalysis.
In case of a non-watermarked video we have Yk = Xk = Uk + αWk, where α = 0.
The estimate of the scaled watermark is denoted by,
Wˆk = Yk − Xˆk
Wˆk = Yk − CL(Xk)
Wˆk = Uk + αWk − CL(Uk + αWk)
Wˆk = Uk − CL(Uk) Since α = 0 for non watermarked sequences (3.10)
Wˆk = nk where nk = Uk − CL(Uk) (3.11)
The residual “noise” from the simple linear collusion scheme is denoted by nk and is a
measure of the invariance of the collusion operator on legitimate non-watermarked data.
Ideally we would like CL(Uk) ≈ Uk.
In case of watermarked sequences we have Yk = Xk = Uk +αWk, the estimate of the
scaled watermark is given by,
Wˆk = Yk − Xˆk
Wˆk = Yk − CL(Xk)
Wˆk = Uk + αWk − CL(Uk + αWk)
Wˆk = Uk − CL(Uk) + αWk − αCL(Wk) (3.12)
Since CL(a+ b) = CL(a) + CL(b) in case of linear collusion
Wˆk = nk +W
′
k where W
′
k = α(Wk − C(Wk)) (3.13)
In the case of the watermarked sequences the estimate of the watermark is the sum of the
noise due to collusion attack and a Gaussian signal which bears a very high correlation
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with embedded watermark Wk. In case all the host frames are same, nk will be zero and
the estimate of the watermark Wˆk will be the embedded watermark Wk. We can represent
the steganalysis in terms of a hypothesis testing problem.
a. Hypothesis Testing
The video steganalysis problem can be mathematically formulated as a hypothesis testing
problem.  H0 : Wˆk = nk k=1,2,. . . ,N if watermark is absentH1 : Wˆk = nk +W ′k k=1,2,. . . ,N if watermark is present
where nk is the residual noise defined above and W
′
k is a Gaussian watermark signal. The
aim of steganalysis is to differentiate between the two situations and simultaneously mini-
mize the probability of false positive and false negative. The probability of false negative
can be defined as the probability of choosing H0 when it is actually H1. Similarly, the
probability of false positive can be defined as the probability of choosing H1 when it is
actually H0.
C. Theoretical Justification and Analysis
The steganalysis method proposed looks at the characteristics of the watermark and uses
pattern recognition for finding the hidden messages. Therefore the accuracy of the esti-
mated watermark is related to the accuracy of the hypothesis testing. In this section we
study the performance of the collusion scheme, estimate the bounds on the embedding
parameters that will lead to the failure of the collusion based steganalysis and find the
optimum length for collusion attack.
We make the following assumptions about the video sequences and the watermark
frames.
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(1) The host frames Uk are assumed to be from a distribution having mean µ and variance
σ2u.
(2) The correlation model of the host frames follows the first-order Markov model where
the correlation between frame Ui and Uj is given by ρ|i−j|. Where ρ is the correlation
coefficient between any two adjacent frames.
(3) The watermark frames Wk are assumed to be independent from Uk and from each
other, and derived from a Gaussian distribution having mean 0 and variance σ2w. Since
the watermark is embedded with an embedding strength of α the effective variance
of the watermark is α2σ2w.
For slow moving sequence where the scene changes are not drastic we can reasonably
make an assumption that the frames have approximately the same mean and variance as
stated in Assumption (1). In Assumption (2) we assert that a first order Markov model
can be used to model the correlation between various frames of a video sequence. By
intuition we know that the correlation between a reference frame and other frames in a
video sequence decreases as one moves away from the reference frame. We model this
decrease in correlation using the term ρ|i−j|, where |i− j| represents the distance between
the reference and the other frames in terms of frame index. We note that the term ρ|i−j|
decreases with an increase in the distance since, |ρ| ≤ 1 always holds true.
D. Effectiveness of Simple Linear Collusion Scheme
The effectiveness of the collusion scheme proposed can be studied by looking at the ex-
pected Mean Squared Error(MSE) between the estimate of the watermark Wˆk and the
embedded watermark αWk. In order to get the best estimate, the expected MSE should
be minimized. In this section we look at conditions where the frame averaging or simple
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linear collusion scheme will be successful in extracting the watermark from the original
frames.
The mathematical equation to represent the expected MSE between the estimated wa-
termark and the embedded watermark in each frame is given by:
E[(Wˆk − αWk)2] = E[(Yk − Xˆk − αWk)2]
= E[(Xk − Xˆk − αWk)2]
= E[(Uk + αWk − Xˆk − αWk)2]
= E[(Uk − Xˆk)2] (3.14)
= E[(Uk − Uˆk)2] (3.15)
This equation shows that the expected value of the expected MSE between the estimated
watermark and the original watermark is the same as the expected value of the MSE be-
tween the original host frame and the colluded host frame.
Proposition 1 Given a sequence of watermarked video frames Xk, k = 1, 2, . . . , N as
defined by Equation 1.2. Under assumptions (1), (2) and (3) the expected MSE between the
original watermark and the estimated watermark obtained from collusion attack is given
by
E[(Wˆk − αWk)2] = σ2u
[
z − 1
z
− 2ρ
z(1− ρ) +
4ρ
z+1
2
z(1− ρ) −
2ρ(1− ρz)
z2(1− ρ)2
]
+
α2σ2w
z
(3.16)
where z = 2L+ 1.
Proof: See Appendix A.1
In the next proposition we introduce the concept of no-collusion attack. We define the
no-collusion attack as the collusion scheme where the number of frames colluded is one.
In the trivial case the estimate of the watermark will always be zero irrespective of whether
it is a watermarked or a non-watermarked sequence.
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Proposition 2 Under assumptions (1), (2) and (3) the expected MSE between the original
watermark and the estimated watermark when there is no collusion is given by
E[(Wˆk − αWk)2] = α2σ2w; (3.17)
Proof: See Appendix A.2
Since the estimate of the watermark is always zero in case of no collusion the expected
MSE between the watermarks is always equal to the variance of the effective watermark
embedded i.e. α2σ2w.
The next proposition helps us in analyzing the success of the collusion attack. We
look at the ratio of the variance of the embedded watermark and the variance of the host
frame. It is a measure of signal-to-noise ratio(SNR) where the watermark is the signal and
the interference comes from the host frames.
Proposition 3 From Propositions 1 and 2 we obtain the following bound on the ratio of
the variance of the host frames σ2u to the effective variance of the embedded watermark
α2σ2w.
σ2u
α2σ2w
<
1
1− 2ρ
(z−1)(1−ρ) +
4ρ
z+1
2
(z−1)(1−ρ) − 2ρ(1−ρ
z)
z(z−1)(1−ρ)2
(3.18)
where z = 2L+ 1.
Proof: See Appendix A.3
1. Discussion
We arrive at the bounds on the ratio of the variance of host frame to that of the effective vari-
ance of the watermark by laying a constraint that the expected MSE between watermarks in
case of simple linear collusion is smaller than the expected MSE encountered when there
is no collusion at all. There is no additional advantage of using the simple linear collusion
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method if the expected MSE between watermarks in case of this method is larger than that
encountered for simple guessing. Therfore we present the conditions where simple linear
collusion scheme will be successful in reducing the MSE.
Figure 6 shows the upper-bound on the ratio of the variance of the host frames to the
strength of the watermark for various values of L and correlation coefficient ρ as given by
Equation 3.18. We would like to recall that the size of the window in case of collusion
is given by z = 2L + 1. e.g. From Figure 6 we see that for a correlation coefficient of
ρ = 0.94 between adjacent frames and L = 4 the maximum ratio of the variances can
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be 10. This means that if the variance of the frame is greater than 10 times the effective
variance of the watermark a collusion length of 4 will yield a higher expected MSE than
the case when there is no collusion. However we can use a lower value of L to facilitate
collusion attack.
The choice of a higher value of L is made to cancel the Gaussian watermarks (Since
limL→∞
∑L
k=1Wk = 0). However, if the correlation between frames is small an increase in
L would increase the residual noise due to collusion. We have shown above that an increase
in L will lead to a situation where the expected MSE between watermarks will be greater
than the expected MSE in case of no collusion. Hence there is a tradeoff and in order to
use collusion to estimate the host frame one will be forced to use a lower value of L.
As the correlation coefficient increases, the upper bound on the ratio increases expo-
nentially. This implies, for a fixed frame variance the ability to collude a watermarked video
sequence embedded with lower embedding strengths increases with increase in correlation.
Given that the strength of the watermark α2σ2w is small in comparison to the strength of the
host video σ2u to guarantee imperceptibility, the practical operating range for parameters
exists toward the right hand side of Figure 6 (for large ρ).
Although Figure 6 provides us with an idea of when the collusion approach to ste-
ganalysis holds promise, it does not, however, give information about the optimal value of
L to produce the best estimate of the watermark.
In Figure 7 the expected MSE between the watermarks is plotted as a function of L for
various values of ρ in terms of the strength of the watermark α2σ2w. The variance of the host
frames σ2u is assumed to be 10 times the strength of the watermark α
2σ2w. For a SNR of 0.1
we see that if the correlation coefficient is greater than 0.86 we do have a local minimum.
The value of L corresponding to the point of local minimum gives the optimum size of the
window for collusion attack for a given SNR and correlation coefficient. Intuitively we can
see that as the correlation decreases simple linear collusion scheme yields a higher MSE
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than the case when we do not have any collusion. The increase in the correlation between
the frames results in the increase in the optimum number of frames needed for collusion to
minimize the MSE. If there is perfect correlation between the frames ideally we should use
infinite number of frames for collusion attack. From the figure we see that the optimum
value of L is 1 and 2 for correlation coefficient of 0.94 and 0.98 respectively.
The reader should note that in the case of fast moving video sequences, the simple
linear collusion scheme applied to dissimilar frames may not result in a reasonable ap-
proximation for Uk. However, in the next subsections we provide a practical alternative to
33
improve simple linear collusion performance for steganalysis that involves using weighted
collusion attack and block based collusion attack.
E. Weighted Collusion Scheme
Linear collusion scheme in the form of frame averaging is sub-optimal since the weights
are assumed to be the same for each frame in the collusion attack. A weighted collusion
attack may be used to lower the expected MSE between the watermarks. The weighted
collusion scheme can be visualized as a low pass filter applied in the temporal domain.
The taps of the filters are represented by the weights in the weighted collusion scheme.
Equation 3.4 can be modified to represent the weighted collusion scheme in the following
way:
Xˆk =
k+L∑
i=k−L
βi ·Xi (3.19)
However we need to empirically find the weights in order to facilitate the weighted collu-
sion attack.
Proposition 4 The weights for the weighted collusion scheme as defined in equation 3.19
is given by the following equation:
B = A−1P (3.20)
where,
P = [1 σ2uρ
L σ2uρ
L−1 . . . σ2uρ
L]T
B = [βk−L βk−L+1 . . . βk+L λ]T
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A =

1 1 . . . 1 0
σ2u + α
2σ2w σ
2
uρ . . . σ
2
uρ
2L 1
σ2uρ σ
2
u + α
2σ2w . . . σ
2
uρ
2L−1 1
...
... . . .
...
...
σ2uρ
2L σ2uρ
2L−1 . . . σ2u + α
2σ2w 1

Proof: See Appendix A.5
The equation suggests that the correlation between frames ρ, the host variance σ2u and
the watermark variance α2σ2w should be known ahead of time in order to derive the optimal
weights for the weighted collusion attack. This is not possible at all times. We can however
have a rough estimate of the correlation and the host variance from the test sequence. The
approximate weights can be derived by assuming a reasonable value of the variance of the
watermarks added.
The other assumption which has been made is that the mean and the variance of each
frame in the host video sequence is constant. This may not be true since due to the time-
varying nature of the video sequences the mean and variance may vary from frame to frame.
So in order to overcome these problems we suggest an adaptive method that can be applied
to calculate the weights, and is free of the above constraints.
In the adaptive scheme we embed another Gaussian watermark to the test sequence
using the spread spectrum technique as defined in Equation 1.2. The test sequence may
or may not contain a hidden message in the form of the original Gaussian watermark. The
idea is to find the weights to maximize the correlation between the Gaussian watermark
embedded to the test sequence and the estimate of this watermark using the weighted col-
lusion scheme. The weights are found using an iterative search procedure such as gradient
descent approach. Once the weights are found, these set of weights are used to estimate
the original watermark embedded in the host sequence. We expect that the weights should
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work reasonably well in estimating the original watermark in the host sequence. The results
using this method are discussed in the next chapter.
F. Block-based Collusion Scheme
In case of fast moving sequences or sequences having non-translational motion the simple
collusion scheme or the weighted collusion scheme may be sub-optimal. We recall that the
aim of collusion is to produce a watermark free frame from a set of similar watermarked
frames. The colluded frame is a close approximation to the host frame. We can imagine
each frame to be made of 8x8 blocks and visualize the collusion attack as the collusion of
the blocks. We note that in case of simple linear collusion or weighted collusion scheme
the blocks that are colluded from different frames may be visually dis-similar and our
assumption that all the frames/blocks in the neighborhood of center frame are similar may
not hold true. So in order to increase the correlation between the blocks that are colluded
we use a block-based similar to MPEG/H.263x coding schemes.
Block based collusion scheme for five frames is shown in Figure 8. The frame corre-
sponding to the center of the window Xk is assumed to be the reference frame. For each
block in the reference frame the best match is found in all the other frames
(Xk−2,Xk−1,Xk+1,Xk+2) in the window. A new set of reconstructed frames
(X ′k−2,X
′
k−1,X
′
k+1,X
′
k+2) are formed from the matched blocks. The matched blocks are
placed in the reconstructed frames at the position corresponding to the reference block in
the reference frame. The reconstructed frame corresponding to the reference frame Xk is
formed by simply copying the reference frame. The process is repeated for all blocks in
the reference frame. Once the reconstructed frames are formed collusion is performed to
estimate the host frame Uk. Like before, we perform the collusion operation to estimate all
the host frames in the video sequence by shifting the window.
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Another insight which is drawn is that the effective embedding data rate that can be
achieved in a video sequence can be significantly reduced if a block based collusion attack
is used instead of frame based collusion attack. The effective correlation between the blocks
will be higher for non moving parts and will help in detecting messages embedded with
very low strengths in those areas. Thus from an embedder’s point of view he/she can hide
the messages only in the moving areas for which a good match cannot be found in the
frames under collusion attack.
Fig. 8. Block based collusion attack.
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In the next section we discuss the ways to implement a pattern classifier. The input
to the pattern classifier will be the estimate of the watermark in each frame. The classifier
will give a decision to whether there is a message hidden in each frame or not.
G. Pattern Classifier
A pattern classifier helps in assigning class labels to the objects from one of the underlying
classes in the training data. In the perspective of this thesis, the pattern classifier should be
able to discriminate between a stego and a cover video based on the input to the classifier,
which is the estimate of the watermark in each frame. The two main components of a
pattern classifier are the feature extraction and the discriminator. We discuss the design of
each of these components in the next subsections.
1. Feature Extraction
Feature extraction is a process of extracting the distinctive features or characteristics from
a data set to help the discriminator in distinguishing between different classes. The features
extracted from the estimate of the watermark will aid the classifier in detecting the presence
of covert data in the video sequence or help in rejecting one of the two hypotheses.
Figure 9 gives an example of the distribution of the estimated watermark Wˆk for a
frame from a watermarked and a non-watermarked video sequence. It is clear that there
exists a difference between the two cases that can be quantified through statistical features;
the case in which no watermark is present results in a distribution that is not Gaussian.
Since we assume that steganography occurs through the addition of Gaussian watermarks,
we employ features that can measure the level of Gaussianity in a signal. These include
kurtosis, entropy and the 25th percentile.
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Fig. 9. Distribution of the watermark estimates for a video sequence (a) with and (b) without
steganographic data embedded [21].
a. Kurtosis
Kurtosis [37] is a value that partially measures the “shape” of a distribution. Kurtosis for a
Gaussian distribution is 3 and for most of the other distributions it is more than or less than
3 depending on the shape of the distribution. It is defined as
Kurtosis =
1
σ2N
∑
(x− µ)4, (3.21)
where σ and µ represent the variance and mean of the distribution. Kurtosis also measures
the peakedness of a distribution. A higher value signifies a distribution with higher peak
than the normal distribution. We expect the kurtosis of the estimate from the watermarked
sequence to have a kurtosis close to 3. The estimate from a non-watermarked sequence
should yield a higher kurtosis value owing to is peakness. We can see from Figure 9 that the
distribution from the non-watermarked sequence has a curve which is peakier as compared
to the other.
Table VII shows the average kurtosis values for the estimates of the watermark over
40 frames for different watermarked and a non-watermarked sequences. We can see that
the kurtosis values from non-watermarked sequences are much higher as compared to the
watermarked sequences, thus supporting our theory. We note that the kurtosis values from
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a watermarked sequence are closer to 3 only for higher embedding strengths. The estimate
of the watermark from a watermarked video is given by Equation 3.13 and it shows that the
estimate is the sum of residual noise nk and the Gaussian signal W
′
k. At lower embedding
strength the residual noise masks the Gaussian signal and hence the kurtosis values are
higher than expected.
b. Entropy
Entropy [37] helps to determine the degree of “randomness” in a given distribution. For
a fixed variance the Gaussian distribution has the maximum entropy. Thus the estimates
obtained from the watermarked video sequence should have a higher entropy than those
obtained from a non-watermarked sequence since there are a lot of points close to zero.
Entropy is given by
Entropy = −
N∑
i=1
(pX(i)log(pX(i))), (3.22)
where pX(i) is an estimate of the distribution of Wˆk shown in Figure 9 for a specific test
case. In [38] the authors define a good steganographic algorithm as one that can minimize
the increase in entropy due to embedding.
We mathematically show that the entropy for the estimates of the watermark in each
frame from a non-watermarked and a watermarked sequence are different and hence is a
good feature for the classifier. Let us represent the entropy of the estimate of the watermark
obtained for non-watermarked sequences as E0 and the entropy of the estimate of the wa-
termark from a watermarked sequence as E1. The estimate of the watermark obtained from
a watermarked sequence consists of the residual noise encountered due to collusion attack
and the Gaussian signal W ′k as shown in equation 3.13. The estimate W
′
k is independent of
nk and hence the entropy E1 can be represented as the sum of E0 and entropy of W
′
k.
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Proposition 5 The entropy (E1) of the estimate of the watermark obtained from a water-
marked sequence is greater than the entropy (E0) of the estimate of the watermark obtained
from a non-watermarked sequence in case of simple linear collusion scheme.
Mathematically,
E1 = E0 +
1
2
log(2epiσ
′2
w ) (3.23)
where σ
′2
w =
2L
2L+1
α2σ2w
Proof: See Appendix A.4
Equation 3.23 suggests that as L increases the difference between E1 and E0 is maxi-
mized. We would like the difference to be maximized since this is one of the discriminating
features used in the classifier. Also, increasing the window length L facilitates the re-
moval of Gaussian watermarks using collusion scheme. However increasing L will also
increase nk, the noise due to collusion attack and increase the expected MSE between the
watermarks. Thus we take an optimum value of L that provides enough discriminatory
information as well as keeps the noise low.
c. 25th Percentile
The last feature that we consider is the 25th percentile of a given distribution defined as
the value above which 25% of the points in the histogram reside. From Figure 9 it is clear
that the distribution when a watermark is present is more spread than when no watermark
is present resulting in a difference in this percentile value.
Figure 10 represents a scatter plot of specific statistical features of Wˆk for different
video sequences that do and do not contain steganographic information. The features are
estimates of the kurtosis, entropy and 25th percentile of the distribution of Wˆk to form a
three-dimensional feature vector that is plotted for different video frames in two different
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test video sequences (shown as parts (a) and (b) in the figure). The colored vector points
represent the results for different video containing hidden information and the clear points
are the results for no hidden information. The separate clustering for the two cases is clear
which makes classification possible.
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(b) Scatter plot for “Hotel” video sequence.
Fig. 10. Scatter plots of kurtosis, entropy and 25th percentile feature vectors extracted in
each frame for two different test video sequences. The colored and clear points
represent the cases with and without a watermark present in the video, respectively
[21].
Once the features are extracted, we build a kNN classifier [39, 40]. More sophisti-
cated classifiers using support vector machines and neural networks [40] could have been
employed for discrimination, but are higher in complexity without providing significantly
improved performance.
2. KNN Classifier
Classifier is an entity that assigns a class or a group to the feature vector extracted from
the test data. In other words it labels the test set into one of the underlying groups from
the training data. The kNN algorithm classifies the feature vector extracted from the test
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data set on the basis of its similarity with the feature vectors from the training set [40].
As the name suggests, the k nearest neighbor algorithm finds the k closest neighbors or
feature vectors to the test feature vector in terms of some distance measure (Euclidean in
our case) in the training set. It assigns a class on the basis of the class labels that appear
most in the k nearest neighbors found. The inputs required for a kNN classifier are the
training data, integer k and the metric to measure the closeness. The value of k will be
calculated experimentally and the training set is chosen using Cross Validation [39, 40]
which is discussed in the next subsection.
a. Training
Training is necessary in a pattern classifier to help the classifier in extracting the important
characteristics of all the classes from the data sets for which we know the class labels. The
training was done in the following way. We picked up 14 video sequences having differ-
ent characteristics so that it represents a broad category of video. These sequences were
watermarked using the spread spectrum technique as shown in Equation 1.2. The same
set of sequences were used to represent the situation where there are no hidden messages
embedded by leaving the sequences unmarked. Features were extracted from both of these
classes and labeled as Class 1 and 2. Cross validation, a method used to find the best train-
ing data from a large set, was used to select the sequences or feature vectors that were used
to represent different classes in the final classifier. The idea of cross validation is to pick
n random test sequences from this training set and predict the probability of false negative
and false positive for the rest of the 14-n sequences. The n sequences act as the training
set for the rest 14-n sequences. The process is repeated a number of times to arrive at the
training sequences that will minimize the probability of false negative and false positive.
This is picked as the final training set and the rest of the sequences are discarded.
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Table I summarizes the overall steganalysis method that incorporates linear collusion
and classification.
Table I. Simple linear collusion based steganalysis.
• Variable Definitions:
N Number of Frames
Xk(, ) k
th frame of the video sequence
Yk(, ) k
th received frame of the video sequence
Xˆk(, ) colluded version of the kth frame
Wˆk(, ) estimate of the watermark in the kth frame
Ok Output from the pattern classifier for the kth frame
Coll() Averaging based collusion attack on 2L+1 frames as described in Section B
Patt() Pattern Classification on as described in Section G
• Algorithm:
for k={1,2,. . . ,N}
Xˆk(, ) := Coll(Xk(, ))
Wˆk(, ) := Yk(, )− Xˆk(, )
Ok(, ) := Patt(Wˆk(, ))
end
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The sequences1 that were chosen for the simulations consist of grayscale video sequences
in the raw format. The number of frames in each video sequence was restricted to 40 due
to memory constraints in MATLAB. The resolution of the sequences varied for different
video sequences. Most of the sequences that were chosen were slow moving video se-
quences due to the limitations of the proposed algorithm in detecting hidden data in fast
moving sequences. These limitations were discussed in the previous chapter. Appendix B.1
contains the description of each sequence that was used for the simulation. We label the
sequences from 1 to 27 as shown in Table 1 and will refer to the sequences using these
labels for the rest of the thesis.
As discussed in Sections E and F of Chapter I, the messages are embedded in the
spatial domain of each video frame to test the performance of our technique. However,
the reader should note that our approach to steganalysis will still work if the embedding is
done in another linear transform domain such as the discrete cosine transform (DCT). The
embedding was done by adding watermarks Wk from a zero-mean Gaussian distribution as
presented in Equation 1.2 into every pixel of each frame. The watermark strength parameter
α is varied to test the affects on secrecy. The values used in our simulations are α =
1, 3, 5. The smaller the value of α the less perceptible the mark both visually and through
steganalysis, but the lower the capacity or robustness of the covert data embedding.
As mentioned in Section B of Chapter III we use a sliding window to perform the
collusion attack. Different window lengths were employed for a simple linear collusion
attack on test video sequences containing watermarks Xk to produce Xˆk. The difference
1The sequences were downloaded from http://ise.stanford.edu/video.html and
http://www.articom.info/1489.html
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Yk − Xˆk was then obtained to provide an estimate of αWk. To determine the success of
the window length for steganalysis, the pairwise correlation coefficient ρ(αWk, Wˆk) was
computed, where
ρ(A,B) =
cov(A,B)√
var(A) · var(B) , (4.1)
cov(·, ·) denotes the covariance and var(·) denotes the variance of the argument random
variable(s).
Figures 11(a),11(b) and 11(c) show the average correlation between the embedded
watermarks and the estimated watermarks over 40 frames using simple linear collusion
for different values of embedding strength and window lengths for various sequences. We
see that in Figure 11(a) the average correlation is highest for majority of the sequences
for a window length of 3. The optimum collusion length increases for higher embedding
strengths which can be seen from Figures 11(b) and 11(c). This is in accordance with our
earlier assertion that for with a fixed value of correlation coefficient and average variance of
the host frames an increase in SNR will lead to a increase in the value of the optimum col-
lusion length. e.g. From Figures 11(a),11(b) and 11(c) we see that the optimum collusion
length of sequence ”alex” is 3,5,13 for embedding strengths of 1,3,5 respectively.
We assume that the embedder uses a low embedding strength for watermark insertion
since a higher embedding strength would leave significant statistical imprints. With this
assumption we chose the optimum collusion length to be 2L + 1 = 5 for the proposed
steganalysis method.
Other issues that require optimization are the training and parameter selection of the
kNN classifier. The number of video sequences required for training for effective classi-
fication is application-dependent. In our work, we employed cross validation to minimize
the probability of false negative with different numbers of training video sequence sets. It
was found that two video sequences are effective for training. The parameter k in the kNN
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Fig. 11. Average correlation between Wk and Wˆk for different sequences.
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classifier [39, 40] that determines the number of “nearest neighbors” searched to reach a
classification decision also needs to be set. Increasing k increases computational complex-
ity, so the optimal value must provide good performance without cost. Our tests showed
that k = 1 gave a low probability of false negative and false positive and higher values of
k did not improve performance.
In Section E of Chapter III we described an adaptive scheme of finding a set of weights
for weighted collusion scheme to detect the presence of a watermark. Using simulations
we depict that the weighted collusion scheme is superior than the simple linear collusion
scheme in estimating the watermark in each frame. The success of the method is noted
by measuring the correlation between the estimated watermark Wˆk and the embedded wa-
termark αWk in each frame. Table VI in Appendix B shows the comparison between the
averaging based scheme and the weighted scheme. We can clearly see an improvement of
about 0.05 in the correlation values for the weighted scheme over the averaging scheme
for an embedding strength of 1. The improvement is not significant for higher embedding
strengths. For the higher embedding strengths we might use the simple linear collusion
scheme instead of the weighted scheme to get rid of the inherent complexity involved in
computing the weights in the weighted collusion scheme.
The probabilities of false negative PFN and false positive PFP were computed for a
given test video sequence by counting the number of misdetections over each of the 40
frames in the sequence; thus if one video frame out of the 40 results in a false detection
the error probability is 2.5%. We estimated PFN by embedding a Gaussian watermark into
a given video sequence and then applying a collusion attack to estimate the watermark
present. The result was then passed to the pattern classification algorithm to determine the
detection result. The fraction of failed detections was counted to estimate PFN . Similarly,
the same approach was applied to unmarked video sequences to estimate PFP .
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Our aim is to detect the presence of covert data in a video sequence on the whole
rather than estimating the presence of watermarks in individual frames. So if PFN and
PPN is less than 50 we still have a successful steganalysis attack. Let us assume that the
PFN for a watermarked sequence is 30. It means that 30 percent of the total number of
frames from a watermarked sequence were classified as non-watermarked and the rest as
watermarked. Adopting a majority takes all scheme suggests that the video sequence is wa-
termarked since the number of frames that were classified as watermarked were more than
the other. The steganalysis method was tested on 3 different variations of the spread spec-
trum steganography. The first method does embedding in the spatial domain as described
in Section E of Chapter I. The other two methods require adding Gaussian watermarks in
the DCT domain which are explained in Appendix C.2.
Tables VIII, IX and X shows the probability of false negative PFN and the probabil-
ity of false positive PFP for the proposed steganalysis method for embedding in spatial
domain. The tables show the error encountered in detection of watermarked and non-
watermarked sequences for different values of alpha using different steganalysis methods.
The comparison between the spatial based steganalysis method based on weiner filtering to
estimate the hidden watermark and the temporal methods such as simple linear collusion
scheme, weighted collusion scheme and the block based scheme has been provided. As we
can see from Table VIII, for an embedding strength of α = 1 the PFN is reasonably low
for most test video sequences. We also note that PFP is higher than PFN and the method
classifies most of the frames of an unwatermarked sequence as watermarked. This is not
of great concern because the overall goal of steganalysis in most applications is to avoid a
false negative detection. Any sequences that is (rightly or wrongly) flagged as potentially
containing hidden information can go under more thorough processing for better detection
results.
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Table IX and X also shows how the performance of the steganalysis technique im-
proves as the magnitude of the embedding strength α increases. It follows that a steganaly-
sis technique that works well for a lower value of α will work at least as well for higher
values. Thus, our analysis of small values of α provides a minimum performance limit on
the algorithm.
The performance of the temporal based simple linear collusion detection is almost
the same to that of the spatial based weiner filtering method to detect the messages. This
suggests no added advantage of using the temporal based schemes over the spatial based
detection schemes that work on individual frames. However we note the improvement in
the error detection probabilities in case of the block-based temporal detection method over
the spatial and simple linear collusion detection schemes.
The steganalysis technique does not quite work well for Sequence No:15 which is
a sequence having a lot of motion. We see that inspite of using block based techniques
the PFP is significantly high and the sequence is always classified as watermarked. This
suggests that the proposed steganalysis method fails if the correlation between the frames
is very low. We can see from Figure 6 that a very high value of SNR is required for video
sequences where the correlation between frames is pretty low in order to have a successful
collusion attack. This is further verified by the simulation results.
The proposed steganalysis method was also tested on video sequences embedded with
watermarks in the DCT domain. The results for false positives and false negatives are
shown in Appendix C.2 for the two different DCT based embedding schemes.
The PFN and PFP for DCT based embedding scheme using Method A shows a similar
trend to that of the spatial based embedding scheme. This is attributed to the fact that
the addition of Gaussian watermarks in the DCT domain can be modeled as addition of
Gaussian watermarks in the spatial domain using Equation 1.2. The DCT transform is
linear and hence any Gaussian watermark added in the DCT domain remains Gaussian in
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the spatial domain. We would like to point out that the proposed steganalysis method has
to undergo no change apart from the training set in order to foil the DCT based spread
spectrum steganography for video sequences.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
A. Discussion
The work presented in this thesis demonstrates the potential of our framework and the use
of temporal processing for effective steganalysis. In this chapter we discuss the salient
features of our algorithm and to what extent we were able to achieve our objectives.
To the best of our knowledge we developed the first video steganalysis algorithm that
takes advantage of the temporal redundancy present in the video. We see the improvement
in the performance of our method over the spatial methods that work on frame-by-frame
basis. This clearly shows that the essence of future steganalysis methods for video lies in
the utilization of the temporal information.
From an embedders point of view the presence of temporal redundancy makes video
sequences an attractive choice for cover objects. But the statistical redundancy in the video
aids the steganalyst too in detecting the hidden Gaussian watermarks. This poses serious
challenges to an embedder since the effective data rate is reduced substantially in order
to prevent the insertion of statistical imprints. We earlier asserted that the success of the
proposed method is a factor of the correlation between the host frames. The chances of
detection increase exponentially with the increase in correlation for a fixed SNR. The block-
based scheme further tries to maximize the correlation by finding the best match in the
previous frames corresponding to the reference frame. We conclude that slow moving
video sequences is not an ideal choice for steganography. The notion is also supported by
Chandramouli in [6]. The embedder should therefore hide messages in moving parts of a
video or choose a video that has a lot of motion as a cover object.
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One of our objectives was to study the trade off between robust embedding of mes-
sages and detection capability of our steganalysis method. We see that the detection rate
increases with an increase in the embedding strength of the watermark suggesting robust-
ness increases the chances of detection. The theoretical bounds plotted earlier suggest using
a range of 1 to 3 for α to foil the collusion attack. We note from simulations that for an
embedding strength of 1 the probability of false positive and false negative are relatively
high as compared to higher embedding strengths. The PFN and PFP are low enough for
a successful detection of a covert data in a video sequence for an embedding strength of
3. Thus based on simulations and the theoretical analysis one should embed the Gaussian
watermarks with an embedding strength of 1-3.
We would like to reiterate the fact that the field of watermarking and steganography
complement each other. The method of estimating the watermark in each frame using
collusion attack as proposed in our steganalysis method can be applied to the field of wa-
termarking. It can be used for watermark detection in watermarking applications such as
content authorization, fingerprinting etc. Collusion attack used in our steganalysis method
helps in getting a mark free copy from watermarked sequences. Thus we have shown that
spread spectrum may not be the most robust data hiding scheme for video as proposed in
the literature. The same conception is supported by authors in [6, 31] who propose different
methods to break spread spectrum steganography.
The complexity of the simple linear collusion scheme is very low and can be applied
for real time applications. For every frame that is under a steganalysis test we need to
wait for 2-4 future frames to arrive before one can perform the collusion attack. At a
display rate of 30 frames per sec this corresponds to time lag of 1/10 of a second. The
processing time is bare minimum and thus the total time it takes to predict the presence
or absence of a message after the arrival of a frame is small enough to be applied for real
time applications. The weighted linear collusion scheme or the block based schemes have
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a larger time complexity and hence is not feasible to be used for real time applications. The
increase in performance of these methods over the simple linear collusion schemes makes
it an ideal choice for all situations other than real-time applications.
B. Limitations and Future Directions
In this section we discuss limitations of our algorithm and highlight the areas of future
research.
Apart from the assumption that the watermark is additive white and Gaussian, our
scheme also presumes that the sender embeds the watermark in each pixel of every frame.
To maximize covert communication capacity, this may be reasonable. However, future
investigation must consider how the affects of interleaving the watermark in select pixels
and frames affects the detection accuracy of steganalysis. Such interleaving will provide the
sender with greater secrecy at the expense of capacity or robustness. We expect that there
is a threshold for interleaving below which steganalysis detection will become inaccurate.
Thus, this value determines the effective covert communication capacity that cannot be
detected.
In order to develop a strategy that works for all embedding schemes (not just the
spread-spectrum based Gaussian watermarks discussed in this paper), we need to target the
statistics of the video sequence [1, 17, 19, 15] rather than solely consider the statistics of a
possibly hidden message. The proposed steganalysis schemes uses a model of the distribu-
tion of the embedded message as reference information. A steganalysis technique that also
accounts for the statistics of a natural video sequence may be more general. However this
method may have some disadvantages and may not target all classes of video sequences.
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This method will fail for those situations where the characteristic of the sequence is differ-
ent from natural sequences. The proposed method in this thesis on the other hand will be
more robust to the outliers.
Another possible change that can be made to the block based collusion scheme is to
detect the presence of a watermark at block level rather than a frame level. A collective
decision such as majority wins can be made on each frame using the individual detection
results on the blocks. The detection results for each frame can be used to detect the presence
and absence of a message in the entire video sequence. It is shown in [41] that a distributed
framework can help lower the probability of false negative and false positive.
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APPENDIX A
PROOFS
1. Proof of Proposition 1
The expeted MSE between the estimated watermark and the orginal watermark as defined
in equation 3.14 is given by
E[(Wˆk − αWk)2] = E[(Uk − Xˆk)2]
= E[(Uk − 1
2L+ 1
k+L∑
i=k−L
Xi)
2]
= E[(Uk − 1
2L+ 1
k+L∑
i=k−L
(Ui + α ·Wi))2]
= E[U2k +
1
(2L+ 1)2
(
k+L∑
i=k−L
(Ui + α ·Wi))2
− 2
2L+ 1
Uk(
k+L∑
i=k−L
(Ui + α ·Wi))]
= E[U2k +
1
(2L+ 1)2
((
k+L∑
i=k−L
Ui)
2 + α2(
k+L∑
i=k−L
Wi)
2
+2α(
k+L∑
i=k−L
Ui ·
k+L∑
i=k−L
Wi))− 2
2L+ 1
(
k+L∑
i=k−L
(Uk · Ui + α · Uk ·Wi))]
= EU2k +
1
(2L+ 1)2
(E[(
k+L∑
i=k−L
Ui)
2] + E[α2(
k+L∑
i=k−L
Wi)
2]
+2αE[
k+L∑
i=k−L
Ui ·
k+L∑
i=k−L
Wi]− 2
2L+ 1
(
k+L∑
i=k−L
E[Uk · Ui + α · Uk ·Wi])]
= σ2u +
α2σ2w
2L+ 1
+
1
(2L+ 1)2
E[(
k+L∑
i=k−L
Ui)
2]− 2
2L+ 1
k+L∑
i=k−L
E[Ui · Uk]
(Using Assumption 2, i.e. EWk = 0, EWi.Wj = 0 for i 6= j and
61
EWi.Uj = 0 for all i,j)
= σ2u +
α2σ2w
2L+ 1
+ A−B (A.1)
where,
A =
1
(2L+ 1)2
E[(
k+L∑
i=k−L
Ui)
2]
B =
2
2L+ 1
k+L∑
i=k−L
E[Ui · Uk]
Now,
B =
2
2L+ 1
k+L∑
i=k−L
E[Ui · Uk]
=
2
2L+ 1
E[Uk · Uk−L + Uk · Uk−L+1 + . . .+ Uk · Uk−1
+Uk · Uk + Uk · Uk+1 + . . .+ Uk · Uk+L−1 + Uk · Uk+L]
=
2σ2u
2L+ 1
(ρL + ρL−1 + . . .+ ρ+ 1 + ρ+ . . .+ ρL−1 + ρL)
(Using Markov Model defined in Assumption 2)
=
2σ2u
2L+ 1
(1 + 2(ρ+ ρ2 . . .+ ρL−1 + ρL))
=
2σ2u
2L+ 1
(1 +
2ρ(1− ρL)
1− ρ )
(Assuming |ρ| < 1, it dosen’t work if ρ = 1)
Now,
A =
1
(2L+ 1)2
E[(
k+L∑
i=k−L
Ui)
2]
=
1
(2L+ 1)2
E[
k+L∑
i=k−L
Ui
k+L∑
j=k−L
Uj)]
=
1
(2L+ 1)2
E[(Uk−L
k+L∑
j=k−L
Uj) + (Uk−L+1
k+L∑
j=k−L
Uj) + . . .
+(Uk+L−1
k+L∑
j=k−L
Uj) + (Uk+L
k+L∑
j=k−L
Uj)]
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=
1
(2L+ 1)2
E[
k+L∑
j=k−L
Uk−L · Uj +
k+L∑
j=k−L
Uk−L+1 · Uj + . . .
+
k+L∑
j=k−L
Uk+L−1 · Uj +
k+L∑
j=k−L
Uk+L · Uj]
The 1st term is =
σ2u
(2L+ 1)2
(1 + ρ+ ρ2 + . . .+ ρ2L−1 + ρ2L)
2nd term is =
σ2u
(2L+ 1)2
(ρ+ 1 + ρ+ . . .+ ρ2L−2 + ρ2L−1)
...
...
...
...
2L+ 1th term is =
σ2u
(2L+ 1)2
(ρ2L + ρ2L−1 + ρ2L−2 + . . .+ ρ+ 1)
The terms can be put together as rows of a Toeplitz matrix and the sum of all the terms is
given by the sum of all the elements in the matrix.
A =
σ2u
(2L+ 1)2
2L+1∑
r=1
2L+1∑
s=1
Tr,s
=
σ2u
(2L+ 1)2
2L∑
r=−2L
2L+1−|r|∑
s=1
T1,|r|+1 (A.2)
where
T =

1 ρ ρ2 . . . ρ2L
ρ 1 ρ . . . ρ2L−1
ρ2 ρ 1 . . . ρ2L−2
...
...
... . . .
...
ρ2L ρ2L−1 . . . ρ 1

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Evaluating Equation A.2 and assuming z = 2L+ 1 we have,
A =
σ2u
z2
[z + 2(z − 1)ρ+ 2(z − 2)ρ2 + . . .+ 2(z − (z − 1))ρz−1]
=
σ2u
z2
[z + 2z(ρ+ ρ2 + ρ3 + . . .+ ρz−1)− 2(ρ+ 2ρ2 + 3ρ3 + . . .+ (z − 1)ρz−1)]
=
σ2u
z2
[z + 2zρ
(1− ρz−1)
1− ρ − 2ρ
z−1∑
j=1
jρj−1]
=
σ2u
z2
[z + 2zρ
(1− ρz−1)
1− ρ − 2ρ
z−1∑
j=1
d
dρ
ρj]
=
σ2u
z2
[z + 2zρ
(1− ρz−1)
1− ρ − 2ρ
d
dρ
z−1∑
j=1
ρj]
=
σ2u
z2
[z + 2zρ
(1− ρz−1)
1− ρ − 2ρ
d
dρ
(ρ
(1− ρz−1)
1− ρ )]
=
σ2u
z2
[z + 2zρ
(1− ρz−1)
1− ρ − 2ρ(
(1− ρz − zρz−1(1− ρ))
(1− ρ)2 )]
Substituting the values of A,B and z = 2L+ 1 in equation A.1 we have
E[(Wˆk −Wk)2] = σ2u +
α2σ2w
z
+
σ2u
z2
[z + 2zρ
(1− ρz−1)
1− ρ − 2ρ(
(1− ρz − zρz−1(1− ρ))
(1− ρ)2 )]
−2σ
2
u
z
(1 +
2ρ(1− ρ z−12 )
1− ρ )
This simplifies to
E[(Wˆk −Wk)2] = σ2u[
z − 1
z
− 2ρ
z(1− ρ) +
4ρ z+1
2
z(1− p) −
2ρ(1− ρz)
z2(1− ρ)2 ] +
α2σ2w
z
The mean µ of the host frames in our proof has been ignored and is assumed to be zero.
However the final term will be independent of the mean even if we take it into account.
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2. Proof of Proposition 2
The expected MSE between the watermarks in case there is no collusion attack used is
given by substituting L = 0 or z = 1 in equation 3.16.
E[(Wˆk − αWk)2] = σ2u[−
2ρ
(1− ρ) +
4ρ
(1− ρ) −
2ρ
(1− ρ) ] + α
2σ2w
= α2σ2w
3. Proof of Proposition 3
From Proposition 1 we know the expected MSE between the watermarks when we apply
collusion attack. To determine the conditions for which the collusion attack is successful in
estimating the watermark, we consider the case in which the estimated MSE obtained from
collusion attack is smaller than the estimated MSE obtained without the collusion attack.
σ2u[
z − 1
z
− 2ρ
z(1− ρ) +
4ρ
z+1
2
z(1− ρ) −
2ρ(1− ρz)
z2(1− ρ)2 ] +
α2σ2w
z
< α2σ2w
⇒ σ2u[
z − 1
z
− 2ρ
z(1− ρ) +
4ρ
z+1
2
z(1− ρ) −
2ρ(1− ρz)
z2(1− ρ)2 ] <
(z − 1)
z
α2σ2w
⇒ σ2u[1−
2ρ
(z − 1)(1− ρ) +
4ρ
z+1
2
(z − 1)(1− ρ) −
2ρ(1− ρz)
z(z − 1)(1− ρ)2 ] < α
2σ2w
⇒ α
2σ2w
σ2u
> 1− 2ρ
(z − 1)(1− ρ) +
4ρ
z+1
2
(z − 1)(1− ρ) −
2ρ(1− ρz)
z(z − 1)(1− ρ)2
⇒ σ
2
u
α2σ2w
<
1
1− 2ρ
(z−1)(1−ρ) +
4ρ
z+1
2
(z−1)(1−ρ) − 2ρ(1−ρ
z)
z(z−1)(1−ρ)2
4. Proof of Proposition 5
The entropy of the estimate of the watermark from a watermarked frame is given by
E1 = H(nk + w
′
k) (where H is the entropy operator)
E1 = H(nk) + H(W
′
k) (Since W
′
k is independent of nk)
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E1 = E0 + H(W
′
k)
Now,
W
′
k = α(Wk − C(Wk)) (From Equation 3.13)
W
′
k = α(Wk −
1
2L+ 1
k+L∑
i=k−L
Wk)
Now since W ′k is a linear combination of independent gaussian variables, W
′
k also belongs
to a gaussian distribution.
The mean and the variance of this gaussian distribution is given by:
µ = EW
′
k
= E[α(Wk − 1
2L+ 1
k+L∑
i=k−L
Wk)]
= 0 (Since Wk = N(0, σ2w))
σ = EW
′2
k − µ2
= α2E[(Wk − 1
2L+ 1
k+L∑
i=k−L
Wk)
2]
= α2(σ2w +
σ2w
2L+ 1
− 2σ
2
w
2L+ 1
)
=
2L
2L+ 1
α2σ2w
We know that the entropy a Gaussian distrbuted random variable is given by 1
2
log(2epiσ2).
Since W ′k is Gaussian distributed with a variance of σ
′2
w =
2L
2L+1
α2σ2w, the entropy of it is
given by 1
2
log(2epiσ
′2
w ).
Therefore,
E1 = E0 +
1
2
log(2epiσ
′2
w ) (A.3)
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5. Proof of Proposition 4
From equation 3.14 and 3.19 the cost function that needs to minimized can be written as
E[(Uk −
∑k+L
i=k−L βi(Ui + α ·Wi))2] subject to a linear constraint
∑k+L
i=k−L βi = 1. We can
solve the above linear constraint problem using Lagrange Mulitpliers. The cost function
can be written as
f(β, λ) = E[(Uk −
k+L∑
i=k−L
βi(Ui + α ·Wi))2] + 2λ(
k+L∑
i=k−L
βi − 1)
∂(f(β, λ))
∂βj
= 0 for j = k − L, k − L+ 1, . . . , k + L
∂(f(β, λ))
∂βj
= E[2(Uk −
k+L∑
i=k−L
βi(Ui + α ·Wi))(−1)(Uj + α ·Wj)] + 2λ
0 = E[−2(Uk(Uj + α ·Wj)−
k+L∑
i=k−L
βi(Ui + α ·Wi)(Uj + α ·Wj))] + 2λ
0 = E[(UkUj −
k+L∑
i=k−L
βi(Ui + α ·Wi)(Uj + α ·Wj))]− λ
E(UkUj) = E[
k+L∑
i=k−L
βi(Ui + α ·Wi)(Uj + α ·Wj)] + λ
E(UkUj) = βjE(α2 ·W 2j ) +
k+L∑
i=k−L
βiE(UjUi) + λ
σ2uρ
|k−j| + µ2 = βjα2σ2w +
k+L∑
i=k−L
βi(ρ
|i−j|σ2u + µ
2) + λ
σ2uρ
|k−j| + µ2 = βjα2σ2w +
k+L∑
i=k−L
βiρ
|i−j|σ2u +
k+L∑
i=k−L
βiµ
2 + λ
σ2uρ
|k−j| = βjα2σ2w +
k+L∑
i=k−L
βiρ
|i−j|σ2u + λ
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The 2L+ 1 linear set of equations alongwith the constraint equation can be represented in
a matrix form in the following way.
1
σ2uρ
L
σ2uρ
L−1
...
σ2uρ
L
 =

1 1 . . . 1 0
σ2u + α
2σ2w σ
2
uρ . . . σ
2
uρ
2L 1
σ2uρ σ
2
u + α
2σ2w . . . σ
2
uρ
2L−1 1
...
... . . .
...
...
σ2uρ
2L σ2uρ
2L−1 . . . σ2u + α
2σ2w 1


βk−L
βk−L+1
...
βk+L
λ

AB = P
B = A−1P
where,
P = [1 σ2uρ
L σ2uρ
L−1 . . . σ2uρ
L]T
B = [βk−L βk−L+1 . . . βk+L λ]T
A =

1 1 . . . 1 0
σ2u + α
2σ2w σ
2
uρ . . . σ
2
uρ
2L 1
σ2uρ σ
2
u + α
2σ2w . . . σ
2
uρ
2L−1 1
...
... . . .
...
...
σ2uρ
2L σ2uρ
2L−1 . . . σ2u + α
2σ2w 1

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APPENDIX B
RESULTS
1. Description of Sequences
The 27 gray scale video sequences in raw format having 40 frames each that are used
for simulations is shown in Table II. Most of the sequences are slow moving sequences
containg scences having little eye, lip or hand movement of the subject. The sequences 1
to 14 will be used for training our classifier. The remaining sequences from 15 to 27 will
be used to test the performance of the proposed steganalysis methods. The training set has
sequences representing from minimal to little motion. The test set also contains sequences
having minimal to low motion. Sequence ”backyard” in the test set is a sequence that shows
some motion due to the movement of the camera.
Table II. Sequence description.
Sequence Number Sequence Name
1 alex
2 carphone
3 container
4 heart
5 highway
6 mobile
7 paris
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Table II. continued.
Sequence Number Sequence Name
8 salesman
9 suzie
10 tempete
11 town
12 trevor
13 akiyo
14 arti
15 backyard
16 bridge-close
17 bridge-far
18 building
19 claire
20 diskus
21 foreman
22 grandma
23 hand
24 house
25 miss
26 mother
27 silent
70
Table III. Average correlation between Wk and Wˆk for α = 1.
Window Length(2L+1) 3 5 7 9 11 13
Seq No:1 0.5124 0.4379 0.3757 0.3336 0.3082 0.2877
Seq No:2 0.3856 0.4616 0.4193 0.4290 0.4086 0.4067
Seq No:3 0.3979 0.2600 0.1851 0.1422 0.1154 0.0981
Seq No:4 0.0512 0.0449 0.0424 0.0397 0.0371 0.0348
Seq No:5 0.2783 0.2535 0.2232 0.2070 0.1963 0.1897
Seq No:6 0.3430 0.3706 0.3575 0.3485 0.3408 0.3378
Seq No:7 0.0593 0.0520 0.0474 0.0448 0.0418 0.0397
Seq No:8 0.1905 0.1484 0.1380 0.1308 0.1233 0.1160
Seq No:9 0.2565 0.2228 0.1991 0.1847 0.1778 0.1729
Seq No:10 0.6626 0.6708 0.6110 0.5274 0.4447 0.3734
Seq No:11 0.1153 0.1062 0.0969 0.0894 0.0835 0.0786
Seq No:12 0.1993 0.1325 0.1030 0.0862 0.0772 0.0700
Seq No:13 0.6190 0.6267 0.6107 0.5892 0.5676 0.5462
Seq No:14 0.1537 0.1488 0.1330 0.1193 0.1071 0.0985
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Table IV. Average correlation between Wk and Wˆk for α = 3.
Window Length(2L+1) 3 5 7 9 11 13
Seq No:1 0.7363 0.7406 0.7074 0.6734 0.6457 0.6214
Seq No:2 0.6882 0.7750 0.7675 0.7819 0.7731 0.7739
Seq No:3 0.6922 0.5957 0.4784 0.3896 0.3258 0.2802
Seq No:4 0.1489 0.1337 0.1243 0.1171 0.1106 0.1048
Seq No:5 0.5839 0.5751 0.5360 0.5100 0.4919 0.4805
Seq No:6 0.6582 0.7186 0.7213 0.7204 0.7167 0.7155
Seq No:7 0.1736 0.1539 0.1404 0.1321 0.1241 0.1179
Seq No:8 0.4526 0.3972 0.3762 0.3636 0.3479 0.3275
Seq No:9 0.5643 0.5374 0.5019 0.4789 0.4673 0.4574
Seq No:10 0.7881 0.8499 0.8515 0.8251 0.7824 0.7305
Seq No:11 0.2950 0.2801 0.2616 0.2474 0.2345 0.2232
Seq No:12 0.4794 0.3629 0.2936 0.2518 0.2259 0.2054
Seq No:13 0.7768 0.8280 0.8348 0.8306 0.8213 0.8111
Seq No:14 0.4033 0.4014 0.3691 0.3359 0.3059 0.2827
Seq No:15 0.6168 0.6029 0.5505 0.4980 0.4566 0.4247
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Table V. Average correlation between Wk and Wˆk for α = 5.
Window Length(2L+1) 3 5 7 9 11 13
Seq No:1 0.7590 0.8419 0.8554 0.8715 0.8726 0.8762
Seq No:2 0.5912 0.5617 0.5433 0.5351 0.5177 0.4943
Seq No:3 0.8017 0.8744 0.8922 0.8879 0.8697 0.8428
Seq No:4 0.6954 0.7178 0.6870 0.6408 0.5983 0.5644
Seq No:5 0.5705 0.5904 0.5740 0.5518 0.5309 0.5174
Seq No:6 0.3112 0.2145 0.1798 0.1655 0.1576 0.1510
Seq No:7 0.5087 0.4709 0.4357 0.4076 0.3852 0.3667
Seq No:8 0.7560 0.7909 0.7778 0.7537 0.7224 0.6901
Seq No:9 0.7590 0.7640 0.7278 0.6925 0.6578 0.6260
Seq No:10 0.4241 0.3882 0.3501 0.3217 0.3013 0.2848
Seq No:11 0.3996 0.3910 0.3738 0.3639 0.3642 0.3572
Seq No:12 0.6828 0.5947 0.5084 0.4466 0.4036 0.3683
Seq No:13 0.7791 0.8216 0.8165 0.8010 0.7860 0.7694
Seq No:14 0.7585 0.7336 0.6472 0.5605 0.4875 0.4288
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Table VI. Correlation between αWk and Wˆk for different values of alpha for sequence
”alex” using averaging and weighted collusion attack.
α 1 3 5
Frame No. Averaging Weighted Averaging Weighted Averaging Weighted
1 0.3720 0.4524 0.7383 0.7672 0.8435 0.8504
2 0.3679 0.4446 0.7353 0.7647 0.8419 0.8487
3 0.4391 0.4874 0.7872 0.7994 0.8679 0.8699
4 0.4364 0.4926 0.7859 0.8000 0.8673 0.8702
5 0.4764 0.5515 0.8095 0.8254 0.8787 0.8818
6 0.4970 0.5499 0.8186 0.8291 0.8828 0.8845
7 0.5167 0.6140 0.8289 0.8444 0.8868 0.8895
8 0.4853 0.5484 0.8146 0.8274 0.8808 0.8829
9 0.4912 0.5827 0.8158 0.8329 0.8809 0.8838
10 0.4636 0.5342 0.8013 0.8182 0.8747 0.8783
11 0.4167 0.4825 0.7722 0.7930 0.8605 0.8646
12 0.4337 0.4989 0.7840 0.8023 0.8664 0.8701
13 0.4463 0.5077 0.7919 0.8071 0.8704 0.8724
14 0.3774 0.4306 0.7425 0.7653 0.8457 0.8506
15 0.4350 0.5104 0.7845 0.8076 0.8673 0.8721
16 0.4325 0.4707 0.7823 0.7919 0.8655 0.8665
17 0.4711 0.5424 0.8058 0.8205 0.8764 0.8789
18 0.4216 0.4806 0.7749 0.7926 0.8616 0.8640
19 0.4163 0.5055 0.7714 0.7996 0.8600 0.8667
20 0.4335 0.4722 0.7859 0.7969 0.8674 0.8700
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Table VI. continued.
α 1 3 5
Frame No. Averaging Weighted Averaging Weighted Averaging Weighted
21 0.3777 0.4507 0.7458 0.7695 0.8470 0.8516
22 0.4087 0.4646 0.7657 0.7841 0.8571 0.8609
23 0.4301 0.4722 0.7818 0.7946 0.8648 0.8673
24 0.4021 0.4314 0.7601 0.7691 0.8542 0.8551
25 0.4041 0.4492 0.7633 0.7778 0.8559 0.8583
26 0.4221 0.4811 0.7755 0.7926 0.8623 0.8659
27 0.4528 0.5172 0.7968 0.8123 0.8731 0.8760
28 0.4572 0.5110 0.7982 0.8098 0.8728 0.8749
29 0.4791 0.5470 0.8104 0.8227 0.8793 0.8812
30 0.3843 0.4207 0.7459 0.7571 0.8470 0.8488
31 0.4266 0.4679 0.7770 0.7878 0.8630 0.8651
32 0.4061 0.4434 0.7657 0.7788 0.8574 0.8599
33 0.4191 0.4792 0.7736 0.7915 0.8611 0.8647
34 0.4703 0.5323 0.8069 0.8202 0.8774 0.8794
35 0.3803 0.4545 0.7455 0.7764 0.8468 0.8543
36 0.3764 0.4825 0.7402 0.7804 0.8436 0.8538
37 0.3867 0.4476 0.7495 0.7804 0.8485 0.8567
38 0.3492 0.4070 0.7149 0.7408 0.8301 0.8363
39 0.3143 0.3729 0.6808 0.7146 0.8104 0.8194
40 0.1926 0.2030 0.4902 0.5008 0.6660 0.6706
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Table VII. Average kurtosis values of Wˆk in case of watermarked and non-watermarked
video sequences.
α 1 3 5
Sequence Watermarked Non-Watermarked Watermarked Non-Watermarked Watermarked Non-Watermarked
1 11.670 53.3703 3.5075 53.3703 2.938 53.3703
2 8.1279 21.3997 3.2317 21.3997 2.9076 21.3997
3 3.1629 102.850 2.8786 102.851 2.8559 102.850
4 5.2722 10.3778 3.3362 10.3778 3.1906 10.3778
5 3.0644 4.1163 2.6771 4.1163 2.6119 4.1163
6 7.0148 7.6084 4.7217 7.6084 3.5211 7.6084
7 21.125 40.0643 5.3969 40.0643 3.4368 40.0643
8 10.561 76.399 3.3026 76.399 3.0214 76.399
9 8.4182 28.2341 3.3834 28.2341 3.1313 28.2341
10 20.625 42.7215 5.0787 42.7215 3.4108 42.7215
11 54.115 60.0454 30.289 60.0454 15.370 60.0454
12 16.475 33.8751 4.2042 33.8751 3.3169 33.8751
13 29.396 188.678 4.6948 188.678 3.2693 188.678
14 3.9711 21.2551 2.724 21.2551 2.7965 21.2551
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APPENDIX C
RESULTS
1. Embedding in spatial domain
Table VIII. False negative (PFN ) and False positive (PFP ) probabilities for steganography
in spatial domain using α = 1.
α = 1
Method Weiner Averaging Weighted Block based
Sequence PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP
Seq No:15 0 100 30 75 37.5 62.5 0 97.5
Seq No:16 10 0 0 0 12.5 0 57.5 12.5
Seq No:17 0 100 2.5 15 0 92.5 10 100
Seq No:18 37.5 100 35 77.5 30 55 7.5 57.5
Seq No:19 100 0 15 0 17.5 15 2.5 0
Seq No:20 75 35 10 90 17.5 97.5 5 77.5
Seq No:21 37.5 40 2.5 42.5 12.5 70 15 55
Seq No:22 0 92.5 20 22.5 10 10 2.5 2.5
Seq No:23 0 100 22.5 87.5 35 72.5 2.5 80
Seq No:24 80 0 47.5 0 25 0 97.5 0
Seq No:25 82.5 0 2.5 12.5 7.5 17.5 0 0
Seq No:26 75 30 22.5 2.5 20 20 5 5
Seq No:27 82.5 100 5 0 15 0 10 0
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Table IX. False negative (PFN ) and false positive (PFP ) probabilities for steganography in
spatial domain using α = 3.
α = 3
Method Weiner Averaging Weighted Block based
Sequence PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP
Seq No:15 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100
Seq No:16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:17 0 0 0 0 0 60 0 100
Seq No:18 0 0 0 100 0 100 2.5 0
Seq No:19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:20 0 0 0 0 0 27.5 0 0
Seq No:21 0 0 0 5 0 65 0 7.5
Seq No:22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:23 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100
Seq No:24 0 0 0 0 0 0 65 0
Seq No:25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:27 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table X. False negative (PFN ) and false positive (PFP ) probabilities for steganography in
spatial domain using α = 5.
α = 5
Method Weiner Averaging Weighted Block based
Sequence PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP
Seq No:15 0 100 0 100 0 97.5 0 100
Seq No:16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:18 0 0 0 100 0 100 0 0
Seq No:19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:21 0 0 0 0 0 2.5 0 0
Seq No:22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:23 0 100 0 95 0 100 0 52.5
Seq No:24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:26 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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2. Embedding in DCT Domain
Messages can be hidden in a video sequence by embedding Gaussian watermarks in the
frequency domain too. We discuss two different ways of hiding Gaussian watermarks in
the DCT domain in the next subsections and present the results of our steganalysis method.
1. Method A
The embedding in the DCT domain is done by first taking a 2D DCT transform of the host
frame. A Gaussian watermark is then added to all the DCT coefficients except the DC
coefficient. The DC coefficient is left unwatermarked to prevent any significant changes in
the visual quality of the watermarked frame from the host frame. An inverse DCT transform
of the watermarked image is taken to arrive back to the spatial domain. The whole process
of watermarking a frame in the DCT domain can be represented by the following equations.
XDk (m,n) = U
D
k (m,n) + α ·Wk(m,n) k = 1, 2, 3 . . . N . (C.1)
whereUDk (m,n) represents the 2D DCT transform of the host frameUk(m,n) andX
D
k (m,n)
represents the watermarked frame in the DCT domain. Wk(m,n) like before represents a
Gaussian watermark and α represents the embedding strength which is constant for the en-
tire video sequence. An inverse DCT transform of the watermarked frame in DCT domain
XDk (m,n) is taken to arrive back in the spatial domain. The watermarked signal in the
spatial domain is given by Xk(m,n) = IDCT−1[XDk (m,n)].
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Table XI. False negative (PFN ) and false positive (PFP ) probabilities for DCT based
steganography(Method A) using α = 1.
α = 1
Method Weiner Averaging Weighted Block based
Sequence PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP
Seq No:15 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 0
Seq No:16 0 100 0 2.5 0 20 0 100
Seq No:17 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 0
Seq No:18 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 5
Seq No:19 92.5 0 0 7.5 0 92.5 0 100
Seq No:20 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 5
Seq No:21 0 100 0 92.5 0 100 0 5
Seq No:22 0 100 0 2.5 0 87.5 0 0
Seq No:23 0 100 0 100 0 97.5 0 0
Seq No:24 100 0 0 0 5 0 85 5
Seq No:25 2.5 0 0 10 0 90 0 100
Seq No:26 0 100 0 22.5 0 95 0 5
Seq No:27 0 100 0 2.5 0 47.5 0 0
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Table XII. False negative (PFN ) and false positive (PFP ) probabilities for DCT based
steganography(Method A) using α = 3.
α = 3
Method Weiner Averaging Weighted Block based
Sequence PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP
Seq No:15 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100
Seq No:16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:17 0 0 0 87.5 0 100 0 100
Seq No:18 0 0 0 100 0 100 0 0
Seq No:19 0 0 0 0 0 67.5 2.5 0
Seq No:20 0 0 0 32.5 0 90 0 0
Seq No:21 0 0 0 5 0 100 0 7.5
Seq No:22 0 0 0 0 0 82.5 0 2.5
Seq No:23 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 100
Seq No:24 0 0 0 0 0 0 72.5 0
Seq No:25 0 0 0 0 0 75 0 0
Seq No:26 0 0 0 0 0 70 0 2.5
Seq No:27 0 100 0 0 0 12.5 0 0
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Table XIII. False negative (PFN ) and false positive (PFP ) probabilities for DCT based
steganography(Method A) using α = 5.
α = 5
Method Weiner Averaging Weighted Block based
Sequence PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP
Seq No:15 0 100 0 100 0 97.5 0 100
Seq No:16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:17 0 0 0 0 0 67.5 0 0
Seq No:18 0 0 0 100 0 100 0 0
Seq No:19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:20 0 0 0 17.5 0 65 0 0
Seq No:21 0 0 0 0 0 82.5 0 0
Seq No:22 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0
Seq No:23 0 100 0 95 0 97.5 0 52.5
Seq No:24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:25 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0
Seq No:26 0 0 0 0 0 15 0 0
Seq No:27 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
2. Method B
The second method of embedding messages in DCT domain is similar to the first one. This
method is popularly known as the spread spectrum watermarking method designed by Cox
et al. [7]. The only change that is made is the way the Gaussian watermark is added to the
DCT coefficients. The embedding of the watermark is done in the following way.
XDk (m,n) = U
D
k (m,n)(1 + α ·Wk(m,n)) k = 1, 2, 3 . . . N . (C.2)
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The typical value of α that is used for spread spectrum watermarking is 0.1.
Table XIV. False negative (PFN ) and false positive (PFP ) probabilities for DCT based
steganography(Method B) using α = 0.1.
α = 0.1
Method Weiner Averaging Weighted Block based
Sequence PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP
Seq No:15 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 0
Seq No:16 0 100 0 0 7.5 0 0 100
Seq No:17 0 100 0 97.5 0 95 0 0
Seq No:18 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 5
Seq No:19 77.5 20 0 0 0 52.5 0 100
Seq No:20 0 100 0 62.5 0 97.5 0 5
Seq No:21 0 100 0 90 0 100 0 5
Seq No:22 0 100 0 0 0 92.5 0 0
Seq No:23 0 100 0 100 2.5 97.5 0 0
Seq No:24 100 0 0 0 17.5 0 0 5
Seq No:25 52.5 75 0 0 0 65 0 100
Seq No:26 0 100 0 15 0 55 0 5
Seq No:27 0 100 0 0 0 10 0 0
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Table XV. False negative (PFN ) and false positive (PFP ) probabilities for DCT based
steganography(Method B) using α = 0.3.
α = 0.3
Method Weiner Averaging Weighted Block based
Sequence PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP
Seq No:15 0 100 0 100 0 100 0 90
Seq No:16 0 100 0 0 7.5 7.5 0 0
Seq No:17 12.5 0 0 0 0 92.5 0 87.5
Seq No:18 0 32.5 0 100 0 100 0 0
Seq No:19 7.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:20 0 95 0 30 2.5 12.5 0 0
Seq No:21 0 65 0 0 0 17.5 0 0
Seq No:22 0 100 0 0 0 55 0 0
Seq No:23 0 100 0 67.5 0 100 0 95
Seq No:24 20 0 0 0 0 15 0 0
Seq No:25 0 0 0 0 0 7.5 0 0
Seq No:26 0 20 0 0 0 2.5 0 0
Seq No:27 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table XVI. False negative (PFN ) and false positive (PFP ) probabilities for DCT based
steganography(Method B) using α = 0.5.
α = 0.5
Method Weiner Averaging Weighted Block based
Sequence PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP PFN PFP
Seq No:15 0 100 0 90 0 95 0 70
Seq No:16 0 0 0 0 7.5 2.5 0 0
Seq No:17 0 50 0 0 0 72.5 0 0
Seq No:18 0 57.5 0 10 0 100 0 0
Seq No:19 0 95 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:20 0 57.5 0 0 0 7.5 0 0
Seq No:21 0 0 0 0 0 32.5 0 0
Seq No:22 0 100 0 0 0 17.5 0 0
Seq No:23 0 100 0 0 5 77.5 0 42.5
Seq No:24 0 100 0 0 10 0 0 0
Seq No:25 0 97.5 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:26 0 75 0 0 0 0 0 0
Seq No:27 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0
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